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Abstract
We discuss how to generate singled peaked votes uniformly from the Impartial Culture
model.
1. Introduction
Within computational social choice, there is increasing attention away from the
worst-case complexity of manipulation and control of voting rules, and focus on per-
formance on average (for example, [7, 12, 4, 9, 10, 11]) and in practice (using, for
example, resources like PrefLib [6]). There is also an increasing focus on identifying
tractable special cases using tools like fixed parameter tractability (e.g. [1, 5]) and do-
main restrictions (e.g. [8, 3]). One of the most common domain restrictions considered
in social choice theory is that of single peaked preferences. In this note, we discuss
how to sample single peaked votes uniformly, correcting a common mistake found in
the literature.
2. Generating single peaked votes
We suppose that the candidates can be ordered from left to right. An agent’s pref-
erences are single peaked when the agent prefers alternatives closer to their most pre-
ferred candidate. How do we generate single peaked votes uniformly, that is, under the
Impartial Culture (IC) model? Suppose candidates are represented by integer points
from 1 to n and votes are single peaked along this line. For example, for n = 3, we
have 4 different single peaked votes: 1 > 2 > 3, 2 > 1 > 3, 2 > 3 > 1 and 3 > 2 > 1.
Notice that half of these single peaked votes end in 3 and, excluding the last ranked
candidate 3, are themselves single peaked votes from 1 to 2. On the other hand, the
other half of these single peaked votes end in 1 and, excluding the last ranked candidate
1, are single peaked votes from 2 to 3.
In general, given candidates at integer points on the line 1 to n, there are 2n−1
different singled peaked votes. Half of all these single peaked votes end in n and are
made up of all the single peaked votes from 1 to n− 1 augmented with n at their end.
The other half of these single peaked votes end in 1 and are made up of all the single
peaked votes from 2 to n augmented with 1 at their end. This motivates the following
recursive procedure which uniformly generates one of the 2b−a possible single peaked
votes in the interval [a, b]. The vote is returned as a rank ordered list of integers.
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GENSINGLEPEAK(a, b)
1 if a = b
2 then return []
3 else if coin− toss = heads
4 then return Append(GENSINGLEPEAK(a+ 1, b), [a])
5 else return Append(GENSINGLEPEAK(a, b − 1), [b])
Other methods have been proposed to generate singled peaked votes that sample
from a different distribution. For example, Conitzer generated single peaked prefer-
ences by randomly picking a peak, and then randomly choosing the next highest alter-
native to the left or right of the positions currently ranked [2]. With 3 candidates, there
is a 1
3
chance that Conitzer’s generator will return the votes 2 > 1 > 3 or 2 > 3 > 1,
but the IC model has a 1
2
chance to generate these votes. Similarly, there is a 1
3
chance
that Conitzer’s generator will return the vote 1 > 2 > 3 (and a 1
3
chance that it will
return the vote 3 > 2 > 1), but the IC model has only a 1
4
chance to generate this vote.
More generally, the IC model is more likely to return votes with peaks in the middle of
the left-right spectrum than Conitzer’s generator. On the other hand, Conitzer’s gener-
ator is more likely to returns votes with peaks at the ends of the left-right spectrum than
the IC model. Asymptotically, the difference between the two models is extreme. For
example, the probability that the IC model returns the single peaked vote 1 > . . . > n
is exponentially small ( 1
2n
) whilst Conitzer’s generator returns this vote with a much
greater probability ( 1
n
). Note that as n goes to infinity, the ratio between these two
probabilities goes to zero.
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